Supreme Court Judgment whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application challenging an award, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Union of India V. M/S Popular Constructions Co.
Date: 05/10/2001.
Facts: The appellant filed an application challenging the Award on 19th April, 1999 under Section 30 read with Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Subsequently, the application was amended by inserting the words “Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996” in place of “Arbitration Act, 1940”. The application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 26th October, 1999 on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
Issues: Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application challenging an award, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
Contentions by both the parties: The appellant has not disputed the position that if the Limitation Act, 1963 and in particular Section 5, did not apply to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, then its objection to the award was time barred and the appeal would have to be dismissed The submission however is that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to special laws like the 1996 Act since the 1996 Act itself did not expressly excludes its applicability and that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application under Section 34.
On the other hand counsel for the respondent,  has submitted that the language of Section 34 plainly read, expressly excluded the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and that there was as such no scope for assessing the sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the period prescribed in the proviso to Section 34.
Principle: Section 34 of limitation act talks about setting aside the arbitral award which says an application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
Furthermore, section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award “in accordance with” sub Section 2 and sub Section 3. Sub Section 2 relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application field beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application “in accordance with” that sub section. Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the Court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the Court’s powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Decision: The appeal was accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
Submitted by:- SHUBHANGI GUPTA.