Deciding Authority: Supreme Court
The given case enumerates the offence of Murder under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 34 of the same. This is an appeal in the Supreme Court where the appellants are the accused.
Briefly, on deliberation over the facts of the case, the conviction of the appellants is based upon the evidence of Malti Devi (PW1), wife, Sumitra Devi (PW2), mother and Lakhan Choudhary (informant) (PW3), father of the deceased Surender Choudhary who were all eyewitnesses to the incident and there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve their evidence. Dr. R.P. Jaiswal (PW5) who conducted the postmortem examination over the dead body of Surender Choudhary found ante mortem injuries on his person and according to him, the cause of death was shock and hemorrhage as a result of the injuries caused by sharp cutting penetrating substance such as churra (dagger). Those injuries were attributed to have been caused by the appellants Pappu Lal who was armed with a churra and Lakhan Lal who was armed with a country made pistol. These facts need not detain us any further since the conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC.
Arguments by Appellants:
The senior counsel appearing for Lakhan Lal, the appellant stated that at the time of the commission of the offence, Lakhan Lal was aged 16 years and 10 months thereby was a juvenile. He should be punished under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and raising the issue under the Indian Penal Code is unjust. The question of juvenality at the time of commission of the offence was made the basis of the case.
Argument by Respondent:
The counsel appearing for the respondents argued that the act was passed in 2000 with effect from 2001 and the offence was committed in 1985. There should not be any question as the act should not be applied in retrospective.
Judgment
The question that arises for our consideration is whether or not the appellants who were admittedly not `juvenile’ within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short “the 1986 Act”) when the offences were committed but had not completed 18 years of age on that date are entitled for the benefit and protection under the provisions of the 2000 Act? Whether they are entitled to be declared as `juvenile’ in relation to the offences committed by them?
The issue with regard to the date, relevant for determining the applicability of either of the two Acts is no longer res integra. The Act that was in operation as on the date of the incident was Bihar Children’s Act. The Actof 1986 came into operation on 3rd December, 1986. The said Act which defines a `juvenile’ as a boy who has not attained the age (2005) 3 SCC 551 of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Section 63 of the 1986 Act provides “Repeal and savings” that, if immediately before the date on which the Act comes into force in any State, there is in force in that State, any law corresponding to the Act, that law shall stand repealed on the said date. The said provision further states that any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed; or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any law so repealed; and the legal proceedings in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation will continue as if the 1986 Act had not been passed.
In the present case, when the inquiry has been initiated against the appellants herein, they were admittedly `juvenile’ even under the provisions of 1986 Act but this issue has been ignored by the trial Court and as well as the appellate Court. There is no dispute whatsoever that both the appellants have crossed the age of 18 years, yet both the appellants, for the purposes of hearing of this appeal continued as if they were to be `juvenile’.
The next question for our consideration is as to what order and sentence is to be passed against the appellants for the offences committed by them under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC? Both the appellants have crossed the age of 40 years as at present and therefore it will not be conducive to the environment in the special home and at any rate, they have undergone an actual period of sentence of more than three years the maximum period provided under Section 15 of the 2000 Act. In the circumstances, while sustaining the conviction of the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the sentences awarded to them are set aside. They are accordingly directed to be released forthwith.
Decision:
The appellants were ordered to be released.
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