Case Brief: A.C. Muthiah v Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr.

FACTS:
The BCCI was registered in the year 1940, under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. After the enactment of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, it is registered under the said Act. Under Section 6 of the Act of 1975, any society seeking to register itself has to submit its Memorandum of Association and regulations/bye-laws/rules.
The respondent No. 1, i.e., the BCCI sent an invitation to India Cements Limited based at Chennai and represented   by its Managing Director, Mr. N. Srinivasan, who is respondent No. 2 herein, to participate in the auction conducted by IPL. It may be mentioned that at that time the Mr. Srinivasan was also the Honorary Treasurer of BCCI and the President of Tamil Nadu Cricket Association. Mr. Srinivasan, on behalf of India Cements Limited, participated in the auction and was awarded the franchised IPL rights for ownership of Chennai Super Kings team by the BCCI.
The appellant is the Ex-President of BCCI and an administrator as defined in Clause 1(n) of the Regulations framed by BCCI. The appellant addressed a letter to the President of BCCI and made complaint about the violation of Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations by Mr. Srinivasan. In the said letter it was claimed by the appellant that Mr. Srinivasan was liable to be penalized since he is the Managing Director of India Cements Limited, which was one of the franchisee   of IPL and IPL being an event of BCCI, Mr. Srinivasan had thereby acquired commercial interest and violated the terms of Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations. Since no action was taken, the appellant has filed Civil Suit in the High Court of Madras at Chennai seeking a permanent injunction to restrain BCCI from permitting Mr. Srinivasan to participate in the General Body Meeting scheduled in Mumbai. The appellant has also sought permanent mandatory injunction directing BCCI to initiate inquiry under clause 32(ii) of the Regulations, by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary inquiry against Mr. Srinivasan. Another relief claimed by the appellant in the said suit is for mandatory injunction directing the respondent No. 1 to exercise his powers as per Clause 8(6) of the Regulations by suspending Mr. Srinivasan as Treasurer of the respondent No. 1 pending inquiry.
As the Court did not grant ex-parte temporary injunctions as prayed for by the appellant, the respondent No. 2 participated in the Annual General Meeting scheduled in Mumbai, wherein the respondent No.2 was elected as Secretary of the respondent No. 1. On the same day an amendment in Clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations for players, team officials, managers, etc. was made with effect from September 27, 2008. Aggrieved by the amendment carried out, the appellant has filed another suit in the High Court. The High Court has dismissed the appeals which has given rise to the instant appeals.
ARGUMENTS BY THE APPELLANT:
The learned counsel contended that the suits were filed by the appellant in the capacity of past President of BCCI as   he was an administrator within the meaning of the said phrase, as defined in Clause 1(n) of the Regulations. It was also submitted that the provisions of clause 6.2.4 should be read with Memorandum of Association and Regulations of BCCI. The appellants further claimed the BCCI to be a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
ARGUMENTS BY THE RESPONDENT(S):
The respondent   No.   1   contended   that   the   suits   were instituted by the appellant in his individual capacity and, therefore, the decision would be binding only on him but the nature of the reliefs claimed indicated that the suits were   filed   in   public   interest   and,   therefore,   the   suits   in individual   capacity   were   not   maintainable.
HELD:
The Apex Court observed that the the appellant is not a member, as defined in Clause 1(b) of the Regulations of the respondent No. 1. Therefore,   merely  because   he  was associated  in  past,   with   the   administration  of  the  BCCI, that fact by itself will not clothe him with any legal right to maintain an action in law against the BCCI.  Also, the appellant does not claim to be a member of the registered society, namely, the BCCI.
It was further stated that the record does not indicate that any personal right of the appellant is infringed. Prima facie the appellant, who is claiming declaratory decrees against the respondents, would not be entitled to the same because no personal right of the appellant is infringed. The Court further concluded that the   appellant   has failed   to   establish   that   the   amendment   made   in   the subsidiary   regulation   6.2.4   is   opposed   to   the   policy   laid down in the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 or   the   memorandum   and   rules   and   regulations   and/or bye-laws   of   the   BCCI   approved   under   the   said   Act. Therefore,   the   second   suit   at   the   instance   of   the appellant is not maintainable at all.
The bench held that on applying the   principles laid   down   by   the   seven-Judge   Bench   in Pradeep   Kumar   Biswas  vs.  Indian   Institute   of  Chemical   Biology   (2002)   5   SCC   111,    it   would be   clear   that   the   facts   established   do   not cumulatively   show   that   the   Board   is financially,   functionally   or   administratively dominated   by   or   is   under   the   control   of   the Government. Hence, legal remedy to be availed of under Article 226 and not under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Further, the   appellant could   not explain to the Court as to what was the factual conflict of interest and how BCCI was put to financial loss because of   participation   by   the   respondent   No.   2   in   bidding process  for   the  IPL  team. It was further stated that IPL started so that   any person   who   is   interested   in   the   game   should   be   able   to participate   in   the   commercial   aspect   of   T20. Therefore, it is difficult   to   uphold   the   contention   of   the   appellant regarding conflict of interest in an IPL since the purpose of this new model of cricket was to maximize outreach of the   game   and   exploit   its   commercial   potential   as   well.
The upshot of the above discussion   was that   the learned   Single   Judge   and   Division   Bench   of   the   High Court were justified in   not   granting   the   temporary injunction claimed by the appellant, held the Apex Court. For the foregoing reasons the appeals failed and were dismissed.

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